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A Problem for RST
The Need for MultiLevel Discourse Analysis
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Rhetorical Structure Theory RST argues that in most coherent discourse consec
utive discourse elements are related by a small set of rhetorical relations	 Moreover RST
suggests that the information conveyed in a discourse over and above what is conveyed in
its component clauses can be derived from the rhetorical relationbased structure of the
discourse	 A large number of naturallanguage generation systems rely on the rhetorical
relations de
ned in RST to impose structure on multisentential text    	 In ad
dition many descriptive studies of discourse have employed RST   	 However recent
work by Moore and Paris noted that RST cannot be used as the sole means of controlling
discourse structure in an interactive dialogue system  because RST representations pro
vide insucient information to support the generation of appropriate responses to followup
questions	 The basic problem is that an RST representation of a discourse does not fully
specify the intentional structure  of that discourse	 Intentional structure is crucial for re
sponding eectively to questions that address a previous utterance without a record of what
an utterance was intended to achieve it is impossible to elaborate or clarify that utterance	
 
Further consideration has led us to conclude that the diculty observed by Moore and
Paris stems from a more fundamental problem with RST analyses	 RST presumes that
in general there will be a single preferred rhetorical relation holding between consecutive
 
In addition intentional structure is needed to make certain types of choices during the generation process
eg how to refer to an object 

discourse elements	 In fact as has been noted in other work on discourse structure 
discourse elements are related simultaneously on multiple levels	 In this paper we focus on
two levels of analysis	 The 
rst involves the relation between the information conveyed in
consecutive elements of a coherent discourse	 Thus for example one utterance may describe
an event that can be presumed to be the cause of another event described in the subsequent
utterance	 This causal relation is at what we will call the informational level	 The second
level of relation results from the fact that discourses are produced to eect changes in the
mental state of the discourse participants	 In coherent discourse a speaker is carrying out
a consistent plan to achieve the intended changes and consecutive discourse elements are
related to one another by means of the ways in which they participate in that plan	 Thus one
utterance may be intended to increase the likelihood that the hearer will come to believe the
subsequent utterance we might say that the 
rst utterance is intended to provide evidence
for the second	 Such an evidence relation is at what we will call the intentional level	
RST acknowledges that there are two types of relations between discourse elements
distinguishing between subject matter and presentational relations	 According to Mann and
Thompson subject matter relations are those whose intended eect is that the hearer
recognize the relation in question presentational relations are those whose intended eect
is to increase some inclination in the hearer  p		

Thus subjectmatter relations
are informational presentational relations are intentional	 However RST analyses presume
that for any two consecutive elements of a coherent discourse one rhetorical relation will
be primary	 This means that in an RST analysis of a discourse consecutive elements will
either be related by an informational or an intentional relation	

Mann and Thompson analyzed primarily written texts and so speak of the writer and reader For
consistency with much of the rest of the literature on discourse structure we use the terms speaker and
hearer in this paper but nothing in our argument depends on this fact

In this paper we argue that a complete computational model of discourse structure
cannot depend upon analyses in which the informational and intentional levels of relation
are in competition	 Rather it is essential that a discourse model include both levels of
analysis	 We show that the assumption of a single rhetorical relation between consecutive
discourse elements is one of the reasons that RST analyses are inherently ambiguous	

We
also show that this same assumption underlies the problem observed by Moore and Paris	
Finally we point out that a straightforward approach to revising RST by modifying the
de
nitions of the subject matter relations to indicate associated presentational analyses or
vice versa cannot succeed	 Such an approach presumes a onetoone mapping between the
ways in which information can be related and the ways in which intentions combine into
a coherent plan to aect a hearers mental stateand no such mapping exists	 We thus
conclude that in RST and indeed in any viable theory of discourse structure analyses at
the informational and the intentional levels must coexist	
An example
To illustrate the problem consider the following example	
	 a George Bush supports big business	
b Hes sure to veto House bill 	
A plausible RST analysis of  is that there is an Evidence relation between utterance
b the nucleus of the relation and utterance a the satellite	 This analysis is licensed by
the de
nition of this relation  p	 
Relation name Evidence
Constraints on Nucleus H might not believe Nucleus to a degree satisfactory to S

It is not the only reason for ambiguity in RST analyses but it is the only one we will comment on in
this paper Another well	known problem involves the underspeci
city of the rhetorical relation de
nitions

Constraints on Satellite H believes Satellite or will 
nd it credible
Constraints on Nucleus  Satellite combination
Hs comprehending Satellite increases Hs belief of Nucleus	
Eect Hs belief of Nucleus increased	
However an equally plausible analysis of this discourse is that utterance b is the nucleus
of a Volitional Cause relation as licensed by the de
nition  p	 
Relation name VolitionalCause
Constraints on Nucleus presents a volitional action or else a
situation that could have arisen from a volitional action
Constraints on Satellite none
Constraints on Nucleus  Satellite combination
Satellite presents a situation that could have caused the agent of the
volitional action in Nucleus to perform that action
without the presentation of Satellite H might not regard the
action as motivated or know the particular motivation
Nucleus is more central to Ss purposes in putting forth the
NucleusSatellite combination than Satellite is	
Eect H recognizes the situation presented in Satellite as a cause
for the volitional action presented in Nucleus	
It seems clear that example  satis
es both the de
nition of Evidence a presentational
relation and Volitional Cause a subject matter relation	 In their formulation of RST
Mann and Thompson note that potential ambiguities such as this can arise in RST but they
argue that one analysis will be preferred depending on the intent that the analyst ascribes
to the speaker
Imagine that a satellite provides evidence for a particular proposition expressed in
its nucleus and happens to do so by citing an attribute of some element expressed
in the nucleus	 Then 	 	 	 the conditions for both Evidence and Elaboration
are ful
lled	 If the analyst sees the speakers purpose as increasing the hearers
belief of the nuclear propositions and not as getting the hearer to recognize
the objectattribute relationship then the only analysis is the one with the
Evidence relation  p	  emphasis ours	

This argument is problematic	 The purpose of all discourse is ultimately to aect a
change in the mental state of the hearer	 Even if a speaker aims to get a hearer to recognize
some objectattribute relationship she has some underlying intention for doing that she
wants to enable the hearer to perform some action or to increase the hearers belief in some
proposition etc	 Taken seriously Mann and Thompsons strategy for dealing with potential
ambiguities between presentational i	e	 intentional and subject matter i	e	 informational
relations would result in analyses that contain only presentational relations since these are
what most directly express the speakers purpose	 But as we argue below a complete model
of discourse structure must maintain both levels of relation	
The argument from interpretation
We begin by showing that in discourse interpretation recognition may ow from the infor
mational level to the intentional level or vice versa	 In other words a hearer may be able
to determine what the speaker is trying to do because of what the hearer knows about the
world or what she knows about what the speaker believes about the world	 Alternatively the
hearer may be able to 
gure out what the speaker believes about the world by recognizing
what the speaker is trying to do in the discourse	 This point has previously been made by
Grosz and Sidner  pp	 	

Returning to our initial example
	 a George Bush supports big business	
b Hes sure to veto House Bill 	
suppose that the hearer knows that House Bill  places stringent environmental controls

In  dominates and satisfactionprecedence are the intentional relations while supports and generates
are the informational relations

on manufacturing processes	

From this she can infer that supporting big business will cause
one to oppose this bill	 Then because she knows that one way for the speaker to increase a
hearers belief in a proposition is to describe a plausible cause of that proposition she can
conclude that a is intended to increase her belief in b i	e	 a is evidence for b	 The
hearer reasons from informational coherence to intentional coherence	
Alternatively suppose that the hearer has no idea what House Bill  legislates	 How
ever she is in a conversational situation in which she expects the speaker to support the
claim that Bush will veto it	 For instance the speaker and hearer are arguing and the hearer
has asserted that Bush will not veto any additional bills before the next election	 Again
using the knowledge that one way for the speaker to increase her belief in a proposition is
to describe a plausible cause of that proposition the hearer in this case can conclude that
House Bill  must be something that a big business supporter would opposein other
words that a may be a cause of b	 Here the reasoning is from intentional coherence
to informational coherence	 Note that this situation illustrates how a discourse can convey
more than the sum of its parts	 The speaker not only conveys the propositional content of
a and b but also the implication relation between a and b supporting big business
entails opposition to House Bill 	

It is clear from this example that any interpretation system must be capable of recognizing
both intentional and informational relations between discourse elements and must be able to
use relations recognized at either level to facilitate recognition at the other level	 We are not
claiming that interpretation always depends on the recognition of relations at both levels
but rather that there are obvious cases where it does	 An interpretation system therefore
needs the capability of maintaining both levels of relation	

The hearer also needs to believe that it is plausible the speaker holds the same belief see 

This is thus an example of what Sadock call modus brevis 

The argument from generation
It is also crucial that a generation system have access to both the intentional and informa
tional relations underlying the discourses it produces	 For example consider the following
discourse
S a Come home by 	 b Then we can go to the hardware store
before it closes	
H c We dont need to go to the hardware store	 d I borrowed a saw
from Jane	
At the informational level a speci
es a Condition for doing b getting to the hard
ware store before it closes depends on Hs coming home by 	

How should S respond
when H indicates in c and d that it is not necessary to go to the hardware store This
depends on what Ss intentions are in uttering a and b	 In uttering a S may be trying
to increase Hs ability to perform the act described in b S believes that H does not realize
that the hardware store closes early tonight	 In this case S may respond to H by saying
S e OK Ill see you at the usual time then	
On the other hand in a and b S may be trying to motivate H to come home early
say because S is planning a surprise party for H	 Then she may respond to H with something
like the following
S f Come home by  anyway	 g Or else youll get caught in the
storm thats moving in	
What this example illustrates is that a generation system cannot rely only on informa
tional level analyses of the discourse it produces	 This is precisely the point that Moore

See  for de
nitions of the RST relations used throughout this example

and Paris have noted 	 If the generation system is playing the role of S then it needs
a record of the intentions underlying utterances a and b in order to determine how to
respond to c and d	 Of course if the system can recover the intentional relations from the
informational ones then it will suce for the system to record only the latter	 However as
Moore and Paris have argued such recovery is not possible because there is not a onetoone
mapping between intentional and informational relations	
The current example illustrates this last point	 At the informational level utterance
a is a Condition for b but on one reading of the discourse there is an Enablement
relation at the intentional level between a and b while on another reading there is a
Motivation relation	 Moreover the nucleussatellite structure of the informational level
relation is maintained only on one of these readings	 Utterance b is the nucleus of the
Condition relation and similarly it is the nucleus of the Enablement relation on the

rst reading	 However on the second reading it is utterance a that is the nucleus of the
Motivation relation	
Just as one cannot always recover intentional relations from informational ones neither
can one always recover informational relations from intentional ones	 In the second reading
of the current example the intentional level Motivation relation is realized 
rst with a
Condition relation between a and b and later with an Otherwise relation in f and
g	
Discussion
We have illustrated that naturallanguage interpretation and naturallanguage generation
require discourse models that include both the informational and the intentional relations
between consecutive discourse elements	 RST includes relations of both types but commits
to discourse analyses in which a single relation holds between each pair of elements	

One might imagine modifying RST to include multirelation de
nitions i	e	 de
nitions
that ascribe both an intentional and an informational relation to consecutive discourse el
ements	 Such an approach was suggested by Hovy  who augmented rhetorical relation
de
nitions to include a results 
eld	 Although Hovy did not cleanly separate intentional
from informational level relations a version of his approach might be developed in which
de
nitions are given only for informational or alternatively intentional level relations and
the results 
eld of each de
nition is used to specify an associated intentional informational
relation	 However this approach cannot succeed for several reasons	
First as we have argued there is not a 
xed onetoone mapping between intentional
and informational level relations	 We showed for example that a Condition relation
may hold at the informational level between consecutive discourse elements at the same
time as either an Enablement or a Motivation relation holds at the intentional level	
Similarly we illustrated that either a Condition or an Otherwise relation may hold at the
informational level at the same time as a Motivational relation holds at the intentional
level	
Thus an approach such as Hovys that is based on multirelation de
nitions will result
in a proliferation of de
nitions	 Indeed there will be potentially n   m relations created
from a theory that initially includes n informational relations and m intentional relations	
Moreover by combining informational and intentional relations into single de
nitions one
makes it dicult to perform the discourse analysis in a modular fashion	 As we showed
earlier it is sometimes useful 
rst to recognize a relation at one level and to use this
relation in recognizing the discourse relation at the other level	
In addition the multirelation de
nition approach faces an even more severe challenge	
In some discourses the intentional structure is not merely a relabeling of the informational
structure	 A simple extension of our previous example illustrates the point

S a Come home by 	 b Then we can go to the hardware store
before it closes	 c That way we can 
nish the bookshelves tonight	
A plausible intentional level analysis of this discourse which follows the second reading
we gave earlier is that 
nishing the bookshelves c motivates going to the hardware store
b and that c and b together motivate coming home by  a	 Coming home by 
is the nucleus of the entire discourse it is the action that S wishes H to perform recall that
S is planning a surprise party for H	 This structure is illustrated below
motivation
motivation
a
b c
At the informational level this discourse has a dierent structure	 Finishing the book
shelves is the nuclear proposition	 Coming home by  a is a condition on going to the
hardware store b and together these are a condition on 
nishing the bookshelves c
condition
a b
c
condition
The intentional and informational structures for this discourse are not isomorphic	 Thus
they cannot be produced simultaneously by the application of multiplerelation de
nitions
that assign two labels to consecutive discourse elements	 The most obvious 
x to RST

will not work	 RSTs failure to adequately support multiple levels of analysis is a serious
problem for the theory both from a computational and a descriptive point of view	
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